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In regions with many local governments, some services are
provided the least in poorer communities where they are
needed the most.
There are nearly 90,000 local governments in the U.S.; each one with its own fiscal and
administrative responsibilities. This ‘market’ for local governments means that individuals are
often able to base their choice of where to live on differing regimes of tax and service
provision, and to exercise their voice to ensure that their government responds to their service
needs. But does the voice of the poor matter as much as the voice of the rich in determining
service levels in the local public market? Using data for municipal governments in the U.S.,
Benedict S. Jimenez compares the municipal budgetary choices in poor and affluent
municipalities, and shows that in highly fragmented regions some services are provided the
least in poorer communities, where they are needed the most. 
A unique f eature of  the local public sector in the United States is the f ragmentation of  local governments.
According to the Census of  Governments, there were 89,004 f iscally and administratively autonomous local
governments in the country in 2012. Two perspectives have dominated the debate on the outcomes of  this
highly f ragmented system of  local governance.
One view suggests that the f ragmented local public sector, where there can be many local governments in
one metropolitan area, approximates a market- like arrangement which provides cit izens a choice of
jurisdictions in which they might live, and that will satisf y their specif ic tax and service pref erences. The
ability of  cit izens to compare and choose among numerous local government-producers spurs competit ion
among jurisdictions to attract f iscally desirable residents, f orcing these governments to produce public
services at the lowest possible cost in order to reduce local tax burdens. Competit ion generated by
f ragmentation, in this perspective, benef its cit izens without necessarily making someone else worse of f .
A second view suggests that the choice available in the local public market leads to the sorting of
population by economic class, creating spatially segregated communities with dif f ering f iscal wealth and
unequal capacity to deliver local public services. Additionally, competit ion f or economic development to
expand the local tax base inf luences budgetary choices of  municipalit ies. Specif ically, municipalit ies in highly
f ragmented regions will be more responsive to the service demands of  f iscally desirable and mobile actors
rather than of  poor households. In this perspective, competit ion clearly creates winners and losers among
cities and their residents.
Using data f rom the 2002 Census of  Governments and the 2000 Decennial Census, I examined the issues
of  f iscal disparity among, and budgetary choices of , all municipal governments located in metropolitan
areas in the United States. Using a location quotient, I classif ied municipalit ies according to f amily income,
identif ying extremely rich and poor jurisdictions, as well as mixed- income jurisdictions. A poor (or af f luent)
location quotient that is greater than “2” means that a municipality has twice the number of  poor (or
af f luent) f amilies in comparison to what it would have had the poor (or af f luent) were distributed across
jurisdictions based on jurisdictions’ shares in the total number of  f amilies in a metropolitan area. 
Spatial Economic Segregation and Fiscal Disparit ies in Metropolitan Areas
It is the rich, rather than the poor, who are the most segregated in the country. Of  the 9007 incorporated
municipalit ies in the sample with complete data, 11% of  jurisdictions have very high concentrations of
af f luent f amilies, whereas only 4% of  are classif ied as being very poor. A large majority of  municipalit ies in
the sample, 86%, contain a heterogeneous mix of  income groups (as indicated by poor and af f luent
location quotients of  less than “2”). Figures 1, 2 and 3 classif y municipalit ies into “poor”, “mixed- income”
and “af f luent” jurisdictions according to their location quotients, and present inf ormation about a number
of  f iscal indicators f or each group of  jurisdictions. All the f iscal indicators are standardized by income, and
are measured as averages f or each municipal group.
Figure 1 – Revenues and Debt per $1000 Income
Figure 1 shows that poor municipalit ies raise more revenues f rom their own sources relative to their
residents’ income. This means that f amilies and businesses in poor localit ies shoulder a heavier tax burden
in terms of  supporting their local governments in comparison with residents and f irms located in other
municipalit ies. On average, governments in poor localit ies collect $57 in dif f erent types of  local taxes and
f ees f or every $1000 in private income, whereas mixed- income jurisdictions collect $48, and only $27 in
af f luent areas.
As f or specif ic revenue sources, poor municipalit ies depend more on non-property tax revenues as well as
charges and miscellaneous f ees in comparison with other jurisdictions. Greater reliance on user f ees and
charges can lead to better allocation of  resources by matching the supply of  services with consumer
demand. Nevertheless, this revenue source raises equity concerns especially with regard to service access
by underprivileged residents. Indeed, it is ironic that user f ees are one of  the main sources of  revenues in
municipalit ies where a sizeable portion of  the population has a greater need f or government services but
can least af f ord to pay f or them. In comparison, af f luent jurisdictions rely more on the property tax which is
understandable given their richer property tax base.
Municipalit ies also support local budgets with revenue transf ers f rom the f ederal and state governments,
as well as through by issuing debt. In comparison with other jurisdictions, poor localit ies are more
dependent on intergovernmental transf ers. Rather surprisingly, while poor municipalit ies have higher debt
compared to richer ones, it is the mixed- income jurisdictions which have the highest debt among the three
groups. Af f luent communities are the least dependent on inter-governmental revenue and have the lowest
total debt relative to income.
Figure 2 shows that poor municipalit ies spend more on average in comparison with mixed- income and
af f luent jurisdictions relative to private income. Higher spending in poor jurisdictions ref lects the greater
need f or government services among residents in these communities, and of  course, lower private
incomes.
Figure 2 – Total Direct Expenditures per type of municipality 
Figure 3 shows expenditures per $1000 income f or a select number of  services. Communities have
dif f erent budgetary priorit ies, but in general, poor jurisdictions spend the most f or dif f erent services except
f or public welf are, utilit ies and transit. In comparison, af f luent municipalit ies spend the least regardless of
service type.
Figure 3 – Expenditures per $1000 Income
Within each type of  municipality, budgetary priorit ies also dif f er. For example, poor communities spend more
than one-hundred times more f or highways or sewerage in comparison with public welf are services. Rich
municipalit ies do not of f er hospital or transit- related services, and spend $0.04 per $1000 personal income
on public welf are, and $0.03 on air and water transportation. Similar to both poor and mixed- income
communities, af f luent jurisdictions priorit ize services such as waste management, sewerage and highways.
Most municipalit ies in the sample did not spend on public transit. 
Local Government Fragmentation and Budgetary Priorit ies
How does competit ion generated by local government f ragmentation inf luence the decision of  municipal
governments to priorit ize among dif f erent services? To answer this question, I grouped the direct general
expenditures of  municipal governments into dif f erent categories, the most important of  which are
developmental and redistributive services. Developmental services include sewerage, waste management,
utilit ies, highways, transit, and transportation. These services help municipalit ies attract mobile capital,
promote local economic growth and expand the local tax base. Redistributive expenditures, which mainly
benef it the poor, include health, hospitals, public welf are, housing and community development. Because
these services involve the transf er of  income f rom well-of f  to low-income groups, they increase the burden
f or the more productive members of  the community without improving local economic competit iveness. I did
not include education, police and f ire protection because they cannot be easily categorized.
I ran regression analyses and controlled f or dif f erent f actors to isolate the ef f ects of  inter-municipal
competit ion on the budget priorit ies of  the three types of  cit ies. Following the market analogy, the more
municipal governments there are in a metropolitan area (more f ragmented), the more intense the
competit ion among these governments. My analyses show that poor municipalit ies located in highly
f ragmented regions spend less f or services that benef it the poor in comparison with poor municipalit ies
located in more consolidated regions. In the hopes of  promoting local economic development by attracting
capital f rom neighboring municipalit ies, poor municipalit ies in f ragmented areas tailor services according to
the needs of  mobile high- income households and f irms rather than their underprivileged residents. Poor
residents need more redistributive services, but responding to residents’ needs requires higher taxation
which in turn can drive away high- income groups.
In f act, regardless of  income classif ication, all types of  municipalit ies in f ragmented areas spend less f or
redistributive services. All types of  municipalit ies in more f ragmented regions also spend more f or
developmental services compared to cit ies in highly consolidated regions. In the highly competit ive
environment of  the f ragmented metropolis, providing f or the needs of  businesses and high- income
taxpayers seems to matter the most f or local of f icials. 
In metropolitan America, f iscally wealthy communities co-exist with impoverished ones. It is important to
emphasize however, that spatial economic segregation—at least, as measured at the municipal level—is
not that severe. The results show that dif f erent income groups, more or less, are dispersed across a
greater number of  jurisdictions. Although segregation f esters only at the periphery of  the metropolis, the
plight of  the metropolitan underclass is surely not a peripheral issue. Research has shown that unequal
access to public services leads to limited opportunit ies and poorer lif e outcomes f or low-income
individuals. How have lower expenditures f or social services at the municipal level, combined with the
declining support f or redistribution programs at the state and f ederal governments as a consequence of
multi-year budget crises, af f ected cit izens’ access to basic social services? This is an important question in
light of  the 2008 Great Recession which is likely to have intensif ied demand f or local public services
especially in metropolitan areas.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Separate, Unequal, and Ignored? Interjurisdictional Competition and the
Budgetary Choices of Poor and Aﬄuent Municipalities’ in Public Administration Review.
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